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Models of Consciousness
Hans Ricke
Wednesday, 09 September 2009 09:15 UTC
Anil Seth wrote a scholarpedia entry that we are discussing elsewhere.
So maybe people here are also interested in discussing it.
Scholarpedia is an interesting concept by the way. Because the entries are written and updated by experts.
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My browser (IE6) crashes when it tries to load that website…
IE7 works OK -
Good to know, Robert
What do you think about Anil’s article? I have concerns about the selection of theories and also of authors, which is natural from my background. Do you think his scope of theories and models is comprehensive?
Yours friendly
Hans -
Models of consciousness
From Scholarpedia
Anil Seth (2007), Scholarpedia, 2(1):1328. revision #65475 [link to/cite this article]Curator: Dr. Anil Seth, University of Sussex, UK
A model of consciousness is a theoretical description that relates brain properties of consciousness (e.g., fast irregular electrical activity, widespread brain activation) to phenomenal properties of consciousness (e.g., qualia, a first-person-perspective, the unity of a conscious scene). Because of the diverse nature of these properties (Seth et al. 2005), useful models can be either mathematical/logical or verbal/conceptual.
[S.P.] I wander, whose definition of the model of consciousness is this? From this definition follows that the model which does not relate “brain properties of consciousness … to phenomenal properties of consciousness” cannot be the model of consciousness. But this is not correct. Moreover, it is not clear what “brain properties of consciousness” are. Also, as follows from “(Seth et al. 2005)”, “useful models” cannot be, say, logical and conceptual.
According to my view, we should make a difference between the models of consciousness and the models of the brain functioning. From this follows that these two kinds of models are independent — they consist of their own specific elements, and, which is more important, they cannot share common elements. For the elements of different models, see my reply to John Matthewson on 02 August 2009 at http://network.nature.com/groups/bpcc/forum/topics/5081?page=3
Best,
Serge Patlavskiy -
Dear Serge,
obviously it is Anil’s definition. He seems to think that a model of consciousness that does not address the knowledge about the brain we have and that is related to consciousness, is incomplete or not worth to be included in his article.
Of course that is arguable, but as well defensible. You might argue that there are possible and meaningful models that do not address any property of the brain. e.g. a purely psychological model.But that would mean to exclude knowledge e.g. about vision that is knowledge about the brain and thus make the model incomplete.
So I would give the point to Anil, although I share your concerns to some extent.
Yours friendly
Hans -
Unity of Consciousness and the Kaleidoscopic Brain
Models of consciousness
From Scholarpedia
Anil Seth (2007), Scholarpedia, 2(1):1328. revision #65475 [link to/cite this article][Curator: Dr. Anil Seth, University of Sussex, UK]
A model of consciousness is a theoretical description that relates brain properties of consciousness (e.g., fast irregular electrical activity, widespread brain activation) to phenomenal properties of consciousness (e.g., qualia, a first-person-perspective, the unity of a conscious scene). Because of the diverse nature of these properties (Seth et al. 2005), useful models can be either mathematical/logical or verbal/conceptual.
[Philip Benjamin]
There are so many models and so many theories on what is billed as “Consciousness” and yet nobody knows what it is that they are defining!! I have no quarrel with any one of these models in particular.
This prescription of a “model” has the following components:
1. It must be theoretical (not metaphysical or mystical implying that consciousness itself is “physical” which is a logical necessity).
2. There are measurable neural EM-correlates of this PHYSICAL consciousness.
3. These EM-correlates relate to physical phenomenal properties (qualia)of consciousness.
4. The unity (constancy) of consciousness is one such quale.
So “consciousness” is physical such that its “physical” EM-neural correlates relate to physical phenomena and maintain its “unity”.
Three principal questions such models raise are:
1. Is there a circularity in reasoning here? Consciousness “is” what consciousness “IS”?
2. How can constancy or “unity” be maintained in the “constant” Kaleidoscopic
“chaos of change” in the EM-“brain” both at the stimulus/impulse/information levels and from the ever changing material atomic/molecular/cellular levels?
3. Could there be equivalent non-EM, physical permanent “correlates” or “structures”?
Best regards,
Philip Benjamin
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Hans Ricke on 20 Sep 2009 wrote:
You might argue that there are possible and meaningful models that do not address any property of the brain. e.g. a purely psychological model.[S.P.] I am talking not about some “psychological”, but about the concrete informational model of consciousness which includes such elements as “experience”, “increment of information”, “point of view”, “subject of cognitive activity”, “object of cognition”, “system{organism}”, “conceptualization”, “self”, “self-subject”, “self-object”, “person”, etc.
The suggested by Anil model of consciousness “that relates brain properties of consciousness … to phenomenal properties of consciousness” presumes that matter is primary, and that consciousness is just an epiphenomenon of the brain functioning — it is just a brain property. My argument is that matter, information, and energy are equally fundamental. Therefore, we should make a difference between the models of brain functioning, the models of consciousness functioning, and the models of the relation between consciousness and the material world (brain including). Since being fundamental element of our Reality, consciousness can be expressed/formalized/modeled only using its own appropriate special means and methods.
Hans Ricke wrote:
But that would mean to exclude knowledge e.g. about vision that is knowledge about the brain and thus make the model incomplete.[S.P.] Vision has nothing to do with consciousness, since the subject of cognitive activity always deals with the cumulative data input. Otherwise we would have to regard such structural elements as “visual consciousness”, “tactile consciousness”, etc. which is not justified. “Vision” belongs to the model of brain functioning which includes such elements as “signal”, “retinae”, “optic nerve”, “brain”, “neuron”, “living organism”, “body”, etc.
Anil says: “At present, however, no single model of consciousness appears sufficient to account fully for the multidimensional properties of conscious experience”. The irony is that no model of consciousness which “relates brain properties of consciousness … to phenomenal properties of consciousness” will ever be able to “account fully for the multidimensional properties of conscious experience”. To construct such a model, we will have to sort the flies and cutlets apart — we have to regard the model of consciousness independently of the model of brain functioning, and of the model of the relation between consciousness and material world.
Hans Ricke wrote:
So I would give the point to Anil, although I share your concerns to some extent.[S.P.] As I correctly understand, Anil Seth is not Plato, nor Kant. I mean that he is still alive and requires there to be no interpreters of his ideas. So, he can participate in this discussion and defend his ideas bodily (if he wishes, of course). But, as I see, he proposes no model of consciousness himself — his paper is just a kind of a meta-analysis. So, I see nothing that can be discussed here any more. Or, maybe, the idea is that anybody can make corrections to the original paper, i.e., some new models of consciousness may be added to that Scolarpedia entry?
Best,
Serge Patlavskiy -
Dear Serge,
if you want Anil to discuss this here, ask him. He is kind of around in network nature, although very busy.
There is a lot to discuss though, the main thing is this: Anil has addressed many available theoretical statements and tried do to a meta-analysis. Those who have been in Berlin (ASSC13) and participated in the tutorial that has been held by Anil, Sid Kouider and Vincent de Gardelle, will remember that the discussion was quite lively and was able to give a few insights.
You may think that everything that is done in Consciousness Science is not worth discussing, but then: what are you doing here?
Otherwise it is possible to have a look if one of those theories can contribute to the understanding of consciousness.
I completely disagree that as you state: “Vision has nothing to do with consciousness, since the subject of cognitive activity always deals with the cumulative data input.” It does not even make sense to me. How on earth could vision NOT have anything to do with consciousness? It is one of the major contents of consciousness!
If you want to contribute to Anil’s scholarpedia entry, try and write to him.
To what you consider to be a model of consciousness that is worth taking note of: there are many people who think they can contribute to this matter: scholars and laymen alike. Even scientists sometimes have a say. And it may make sense to try on a psychological level alone. I am advocating an interdisciplinary approach. The psychological approach is much underrated in my opinion. As are others. Models can be compared, that may be part of their usefulness.
Yours friendly
Hans -
Hans Ricke on 25 Sep 2009 wrote:
if you want Anil to discuss this here, ask him. He is kind of around in network nature, although very busy.[S.P.] If Anil wants me (or somebody else) to comment on his ideas, he must a) come up with his own ideas, and b) participate in the discussion bodily. By the way, we all are “very busy”.
Hans Ricke wrote:
There is a lot to discuss though, the main thing is this: Anil has addressed many available theoretical statements and tried do to a meta-analysis.[S.P.] In my previous post I have said: “But, as I see, he proposes no model of consciousness himself — his paper is just a kind of a meta-analysis.” I take no interest in discussing the meta-analytical papers, since I am very well acquainted with the listed theories and models.
Hans Ricke wrote:
You may think that everything that is done in Consciousness Science is not worth discussing, but then: what are you doing here?[S.P.] Please, point me to my saying from which follows that “everything that is done in Consciousness Science is not worth discussing”. But, the truth is that there is done, in fact, not much in this field yet.
Hans Ricke wrote:
How on earth could vision NOT have anything to do with consciousness? It is one of the major contents of consciousness![S.P.] Vision — it is just a way of transformation of the physical signals. Consciousness in not “generated” by retinae. Information is not sent by optic nerve. What is sent is just a physical sensory signal. The congenitally blind person possesses consciousness as well and has other senses exacerbated. This fact fits well into my model which presumes that the subject of cognitive activity always deals with the cumulative data input. Moreover, consciousness does not cease even in case of the total absence of data input — in this case the already available elements of experience are being processed and conceptualized anew.
Hans Ricke wrote:
To what you consider to be a model of consciousness that is worth taking note of: there are many people who think they can contribute to this matter: scholars and laymen alike. Even scientists sometimes have a say.[S.P.] Please, name a few “people who think they can contribute to this matter.” Are there many people who, say, have commented on your JCS paper? Please, name, at least, one of them. I would much like to see other commentaries. The irony is that there are no “scientists” in the field of consciousness studies yet. To be a scientists in any field, a person must possess the appropriate method of study, and the appropriate theoretical explanatory framework. So, we are all still pupils here, but not scientists. From the fact that one is a scientist in Physics or Neurophysiology does not follow that he is a scientist in the field of consciousness studies.
Friendly,
Serge Patlavskiy -
Dear Serge,
you wrote: “Vision — it is just a way of transformation of the physical signals. Consciousness in not “generated” by retinae.”
Vision is also not “generated” by retinae. Vision or the informational visual content that becomes conscious is mainly generated in the brain. Do you agree?
I wonder if you recall the definition of consciousness Alfredo and I gave in our JCS article.
Yours friendly
Hans -
Hans Ricke on 26 September 2009 wrote:
Vision or the informational visual content that becomes conscious is mainly generated in the brain. Do you agree?[S.P.] Of course, not. First of all, it is not “[v]ision or the informational visual content” that “become[s] conscious” — it already is conscious. There can be no “informational content” prior to the process of cognition. It is a “content-free” physical sensory signal that becomes conscious, or, that acquires a certain informational content due to the processing and conceptualization, or due to the activity of consciousness.
And, secondly. The acts of processing and conceptualization are the elements of the informational model, or the model of consciousness functioning, while the brain is the element of the physical, or physiological model. It is impermissible mixing up the two different kinds of models.
Hans Ricke wrote:
I wonder if you recall the definition of consciousness Alfredo and I gave in our JCS article.[S.P.] You means this one: “…consciousness is a process that occurs in a subject (the living individual) & the subject has an experience (he/she interacts with the environment, completing action-perception cycles) & the experience has reportable informational content (information patterns embodied in brain activity that can be conveyed by means of voluntary motor activity).”?
I have already expressed my opinion concerning this definition. Do you have some other? As to the “information patterns embodied in brain activity’” see also my recent commentary on Stephen Goldberg’s “Anatomy of the Soul” on the jcs-online, post #7373.
I would like to repeat it once more (see http://network.nature.com/groups/bpcc/forum/topics/1585?page=79 on 24 Jan 2009): Consciousness is what a conscious being expects it to be. Who defines itself always has many names.
Kindly,
Serge Patlavskiy
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