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Defining Consciousness
Hans Ricke
Sunday, 24 May 2009 05:48 UTC
The special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies is now available here and I would like to discuss it in small portions to avoid another thread that is too huge to be read.
My first proposal is the editorial written by Chris Nunn
added 17 June 2009 14:08 UTC
Dear all, seeing how this discussion evolves I would like to keep this thread confined to two subtopics: 1. discussing Chris Nunn’s editorial and 2. discussing the general way how we want to discuss the whole special issue of the Journal of consciousness studies.
Let us open different threads for different other subtopics, e.g. articles. The big thread has quite often been criticized because of addressing too many aspects of this matter. So please, let us not fall back into the same track.
added 7 July 2009
As of today this thread will be locked for a few days. Hopefully there will be a new discussion about one of the articles soon.
added 31 July 2009
apparently there is no interest in discussing more articles of the special issue here. Thread will again be locked. If anyone is interested please notify me by a personal message.
updatded 8 September 2009
You will find two links that are related to the definition of consciousness below. The respective threads may be found this way.
Both threads have been part of a major effort of this forum dedicated to the definition of Consciousness.
Yours friendly
Hans
Two Links related to the definition of conciousness
1. the discussion of our JCS article
2. a very long thread about defining consciousness
Updated 09 September 2009 09:35 UTC
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Dear Serge,
you wrote:“When practicing, we are improving not our consciousness, but our ability to access to its hidden potentialities.”
Maybe you did not see that I openend another thread to discuss this.
Yours friendly
Hans -
Hans, my friend, please look at our statements;
Hans Ricke, 2008-05-17: “My actual concern is the situation that no generally agreed upon definition or a set of definitions exists within the fields of science that are working on the phenomenon of consciousness.”
Christopher Holvenstot, 2009-06-16: “ …we are no closer to a user friendly definition of consciousness than we were a hundred yrs ago, despite piles of cognitive and neurological and social science data.”
We are not in disagreement. I had to ask myself why my statement seems the extraordinary one that needs proof. I am guessing you feel I discount all the hard work that went into the piles of cognitive, neurological and social science data that have accrued in 100 yrs. I do not. I’m a great admirer of dedication in any field. As we both point out, the data hasn’t added up to a proper, useable definition. I think your response to my statement is an admirable impulse to defend the inherent worthiness of scientific practice. You feared I was being disrespectful. I will be as mindful as I can of my wording in the future. It’s a tricky thing though as I am obliged to point out that scientific practice, as inherently worthy as it is, hasn’t, w/ a hundred yrs. of effort, proved itself sufficient to subdue the issue of a conscious condition. Even difficult things have to be said. We are truth seekers here, one and all. The issue of consciousness poses a difficult question for those firmly rooted in the precepts of science: are we beholden to truth or to the rules, limits and assumptions of science even if it can’t get us there?
And yes, I understand this isn’t the purpose of this thread. I shall post elsewhere as you advised. My main concern is for a useable definition of consciousness and the effect it will have on the human adventure. I seek forward movement as I know you do too. Thanks and keep up the good work.
Best,
CH -
Dear Christopher,
I really mean it! The position you took (about the last 100 years of science concerning consciousness) is more difficult to defend than e.g. a position that would claim that today’s definition of consciousness has not catched up with the one Buddha used more than 2000 years ago.
Especially if we consider a user friendly definition. What do you mean by that anyway? Sounds interesting.
Considering the last 100 years there are remarkable insights. Americans (are you American?) often underestimate Freud. Nevertheless Freud contributed to an understanding of consciousness, that changed the definition of so many people (users?) that I could easily defend, that he is of similar importance to science than Einstein. In Europe most people, most scientist probably share this view.
Are you discarding Freud as many American scientists might do?
Also, Alfredo suggested a brilliant approach called “referential nucleus” which points to definitions that are inherent and just need a little help to get from an implicit state to an explicit state.
I am sure you read our article, what do you think of that idea?We might disagree severely about the importance new ways of looking at consciousness, new ways of understanding consciousness have had for psychotherapy in the last 100 years.
We may disagree much less over the question what is a user friendly definition in the sense what is needed now. For a science of consciousness and for the people who would benefit from a science of consciousness.
Yours friendly
Hans -
Hi all,
My “own” definition of consciousness has evolved into “that brain activity which is accompanied by a subjective experience”. Nothing new here.
I am a monist, so for me it is (only) the brain which is conscious. Not all of it, since there is brain activity during several unconscious states and lots happen “under the radar” all the time.
As long as we are unaware of which regions need to be active for consciousness to “emerge”, we have no way of knowing about the consciousness of other brains. But given the complexity of brains, it is likely that other complex creatures also have conscious brain activity.
But a zombie would seem conscious to me as long as the same muscles are contracted in the same patterns as in the only creature I know that is conscious for sure (me).
Those states where a brain is conscious but doesn’t form long term memories (dreaming sleep and severe alcohol intoxication) are spooky but interesting in their own right.
Sorry, if I’m repeating what’s been said already many times,I am new here.
Regards,
Sussa -
Hans,
I take it you understand the larger purpose of my emphatic expression. I was making the point that we have work to do and that a different way of thinking is required of us. We agree that thus far we have failed to understand by what parameters consciousness should be explained and defined. Yes? You might also agree re. something of more immediate importance, that we (as a culture) have failed to understand our condition in relation to the workings of the earth and its ecosystems – and that as a result of this failure we are in the throes of an ecological endgame with mass extinctions and catastrophic climatic changes, etc. My larger point is that these two failures are related and that a proper resolution of the failure of a definition of consciousness can favorably rectify the failure in our misunderstanding our condition and relationship to the natural world.
In my opinion, any definition will fail that does not explicitly embrace the condition of awareness that extends throughout nature and of which we are a part. A definition that only further glorifies the cognitive self-models of humans at the expense of the rest of nature will further validate the behaviors that are sealing our shameful fate as the destroyers of the only living planet. Incidentally and completely parenthetically, I think Freud’s work would fall into this category of purely human emphasis; Jung’s; not as much. Buddha had excellent insight into the veil of meaning we create from a ground state of non-meaning (a good def. of consciousness) but the assertion that the ground-state is in essence incommunicable renders it irritatingly private and unshareable and confined to the subjective realm; a spa treatment for stressed individuals rather than a framework for cultural change, social and/or ecological justice, etc.
By ‘user-friendly’ I mean a definition of consciousness that is useful to the sciences but more importantly that the entire culture can easily comprehend and be guided by. Thanks for inviting me to comment on your paper. I will.
Best
CH -
I read through the JCS issue on defining consciousness. It appeared to be of very modest quality and did not add anything new to the debate. Ignoring my own contribution, for which I can not objectively evaluate, the standard of the now closed thread on consciousness consisted of both higher and lower standard comments and is a far more informative source that the JCS issue.
The only thing the JCS issue had was a few names of mostly burnt out minds which very limited imagination and originality. But then the finest minds do not want to be tainted with this as yet unsolvable issue and quite understandably so. Nothing from Baas, for instance.
As noone can agree on what it is exactly that needs to be defined, no definition is likely ever to be generally agreed upon.
Robert
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RKS wrote “As no one can agree on what it is exactly that needs to be defined, no definition is likely ever to be generally agreed upon.”
… and THAT takes us all the way back to my original perspective in focusing on what is POSSIBLE given the neurology dynamics and meaning generation. All of these lists are so focused on the trees that an all-encompassing definition is not possible since EACH given definition is a PART of the whole.
If we focus on the forest and the bedrock upon which, out of which, it develops we can map out all POSSIBLE forms (‘trees’), ever so vaguely, but still useful in mapping out the properties and methods of consciousness and a general definition of such where definition means LANGUAGE and so we can map all possible categories IN GENERAL and customise from there – as the IDM model does.
CH wrote “Christopher Holvenstot, 2009-06-16: “ …we are no closer to a user friendly definition of consciousness than we were a hundred yrs ago, despite piles of cognitive and neurological and social science data.””
WRONG. Given the neurological, emotional, and cognitive data we can identify how we derive meaning and so all possible classes of meaning applicable to any subject IN GENERAL and that includes consciousness.
The abstract domain model of IDM gives us this general set of vague classes of meanings applicable to anything where such includes consciousness as an agent of mediation with each class a particular strategy in dealing with the environment – real or imagined.
The focus of each of us manifests a ‘small world network’ derived from mixing nature and nurture. As such, being unique, each of us manifest particular forms of, instances of, the classes of consciousness POSSIBLE given the possible vague meanings derivable from the neurology.
Simple, but obviously, for all of you specialists, incomprehensible. Simply put, IMHO all of you specialists are out of your depth, too serial in thought, too localised. Generalising from the local will not work, one has to understand the unconscious processes taking us from the general to the particular to the singular to comprehend vaguely, what is going on. Being specialist there are aspects not experienced/considered by each of us but in working backwards to the general we can map out the ‘Language of the Vague’ that seeds us all in our derivation of meanings and so map the set of POSSIBLE definitions where such sum to cover the whole of consciousness – vaguely. THEN comes local context customisations from which most of you are working in trying to define consciousness.
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Sussa,
what is so special about the brain? Why can’t a suitably programmed computer also be conscious?If a computer can be conscious, then consciousness is a particular algorithm.
On the other hand, you may consider that a computer with a single central processor or processors may not be able to be conscious because the brain has many centres ~ perhaps every neuron is like a CPU?
In that case we should be able to network a sufficient number of CPUs together to form consciousness. As CPUs are many orders of magnitude faster than neurons we only need a much smaller number where each CPU emulates a few tens of thousands of neurons. We’d still need a million CPUs to do the whole brain but then we only really need to do consciousness – no need to emulate the thousand or so neurons that control the anal sphincter, for instance.
In that case, consciousness is a particular arrangement of processing units. You don’t need a brain for that.
One way of understanding what consciousness really is, or to understand or explain your position, is to put consciousness into another environment, even if that emulation of consciousness is an ‘in principle’ setting only eg a computer with ten billion CPUs. In this way we can better understand what aspect of human behaviour you consider consciousness to be, we can see how you are seeing consciousness and what part of consciousness you think is essential and what parts are merely peripheral, supportive or epi-phenomenal.
Robert
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Sussa (and all)
On the definition of consciousness: almost all definitions of consciousness are valid and most are correct, the exception being those definitions that boldly state that all other definitions are wrong (these should be dismissed out-of-hand).To understand those carefully thought through definitions that I here state are most probably correct one needs to know to what the definitions refer. If you think that a particular definition is wrong then chances are you and the author of definition have something entirely different in mind when evoking the word ‘consciousness’.
Indeed, most definitions can be read as a statement of what the author counts as consciousness. That may not be the same as what you count as consciousness.
Thus the first part of definition of consciousness, emotion, or any of the other words that are strongly influenced by context and perspective is to outline what it is that is being defined as a preamble to a definition. For instance one may consider all brain activity that is not ‘subconscious’ to be conscious where some definition of subconscious is separately given. Or one may refer to some wide consensus of subjective experience or some measurable behaviour or some particular brain activity and so on.
Thus I can choose to measure your definition against what I count as consciousness and decide whether or not your definition describes consciousness accurately. Or I can assume that your definition is probably right and from that deduce what you must be considering consciousness to be and then reconsider your definition in the light of what is being defined.
But most researchers are interested in trying to force all others to view consciousness only as they do, and pretty well all these researchers do so in light of the discipline to which they belong. So we have definitions strongly leaning toward the medical, neurological, philosophical etc etc aspects of consciousness and usually in a form that is totally unusable, irrelevant, or nonsensical to other disciplines. The general public, whom science is supposed to be serving, usually come last though in books on consciousness, to be sold to the public, claims of relevance are made in introductory chapters before the usual snub proceeds.
I am just reading a book on emotions which is echoing the behaviourist line that subjective experience is far to unreliable to be considered. Odd that the book is on ‘emotion’ when, without subjective experience, all one can study is emotional behaviour and not emotion (as the researcher has shut themselves out from the subjectively felt phenomena called ‘emotion’).
Robert
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RKS wrote “I am just reading a book on emotions which is echoing the behaviourist line that subjective experience is far to unreliable to be considered. Odd that the book is on ‘emotion’ when, without subjective experience, all one can study is emotional behaviour and not emotion (as the researcher has shut themselves out from the subjectively felt phenomena called ‘emotion’).”
The classes of emotions are derived from the SAME source as the classes of consciousness and as such allow for identification of emotions seeding consciousness, seeding our choice of strategy in mediating with an environment, real or imagined.
The classes of emotion reflect a more generic set of classes covering intent in dealing with context, to replace it or coexist with it. The communication of that intent is through emotional expressions derived from recursing the fight/flight dichotomy.
The focus you and most others fail to understand is that of the base level of the neural hierarchy, where there are no symbols that allow for ‘out of context’ communication, any meaning is single context, mapped to the immediacy of senses and no ‘seeing over the horizon’. As such there is, for example, the sensation of ‘wholeness’ that is then abstracted in languages to nouns and so all named entities etc etc. Differences are thus by indication, pointing to ‘this’ or ‘that’ rather than the abstractions of labels that allow for reference to “tree” from “rock” etc
When symbolism develops we are still dependent upon the base level of the neurology and as such all symbols reduce to their ‘concrete forms’ – the meanings operating at the base level. It is this feature of the neurology that allows for the making of analogies and metaphors.
The set of all POSSIBLE classes of meanings, identified at the base level, contains all patterns of meaning that are relabelled depending on the specialist context – e.g. emotional assessments of reality, or mathematical assessments of reality, or yin/yang assessments of reality, or assessments of classes of consciousness or assessments of personas etc etc etc – different labels/contexts, same core meanings (as feelings).
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