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Might a general rule be a solution for the question of the correlation between neuronal processes and consciousness?
Elisabeth Daegling
Friday, 04 July 2008 18:04 UTC
In the „consciousness“-forum I´ve presented an idea which better might be discussed in this forum. But please be aware that it is really the presentation of an idea.
My suggestion is that neuronal processes run rule-describing. I have proposed that it must be a general cause-effect- rule and I refered to a contribution of Wolf Singer – *that the general organization of the structure of the brain suggests to the conclusion that in the neocortex a single algorithm of processing must be realized which suits to the application of the most different contents and which iteration could lead to increasing cognitive (mental) efforts. * I suggest that such a general rule could be this algorithm.
Thus the rule itself must be a description of causal correlations: condition–action/effect–consequence-units – or in a more formal kind: If X (condition) and Y (action/effect), then Z (consequence) must be included.
X, Y and Z are blank positions, variables in which different contents could be filled in. And now I ought to make a prediction: neurons additional to their well-known functions gain some new functions accordingly to the particular variable. That means the particular function of a neuron is not arbitrary.
I have demonstrated by an interaction of opponent cells by an example in which way the rule must apply :
„A red-green- neuron (condition X) a white-black-neuron( action/ effectY ) and a blue-yellow- neuron (consequence Z including). These neurons receive impulses by cells of th receptor-systems and interact in a way which could be descripted by the rule. If the rule ist „fulfilled“ they synchronize their activities.“
The reason why a red-green-neuron has the function X is: it receives signals by S-, L- and M-receptor-cells and the subtraction of the L- and- M- inputs effects an axonal reaction. This reaction is the precondition for the reaction of the white-black-cell (Y) which on its part adds the L- and M- reactions. The function Y of the white-black-cell (luminance) is due to dependance of the exposure to light. The difference between the reaction of the white-black-cell and the S-receptor-reaction leads in consequence to a blue-yellow-polarity.
In the same way – so my predinction – feature-specific neurons in premotor- and motor areas (to compute the lokalization and the motion of an object ) and temporal regions ( to compute the contours) must interact in the same way.
Rule-descripted interacting must have a second effect – the production (or creation) of electrophysical potentials – or patterns (I think, event-related potentials and slow brain potentials might be good candidates for this job). I suggest that these space-time-patterns are identical with what we experience – and identic means: patterns and experiences own the same properties – they are one and the same in two different views: measureable patterns in the third-person-view and first-person-view when they will be experienced.
Due to my assumption that all processes run iterating at least in the first period colour-specific neurons form the variable condition, motion-specific neurons form the variable Y and contour-specific neurons form the variable Z to run rule-descripted. In common they are involved in a process to produce a complex pattern which is identic with the shape of an object – as a homogeneous whole.
To produce this complex pattern all processes must run recursive.
Elisabeth Dägling
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Dear Hans,
I hope you don’t mind my pressing you on this. Do you then claim that your thoughts, questions, or solutions do not each have distinctive qualia?
What I’m suggesting is that regardless of the difficulty in finding the corresponding biophysical analogs in the brain, we must look beyond mere correlates and try to find the biophysical analogs that can be demonstrated to exhibit some similarity to the properties of our qualia.
Best,
Arnold
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Dear Elizabeth,
I will sign off here now. I am afraid I have no idea what it would mean for consciousness to be a system.Jo
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Dear Jo,
that´s a pity, and I´m a little bit disappointed.
The psychologist Norbert Bischof defines the term ´system´ as a concrete sector of the physical reality in which interactions happen,that means, processes do run.
This definiton applies to different systems as e.g. immune system, social system, educational system, cardiac and circulatory system, a single cell and also to big concerns as a system – why not to consciousness?
The term itself doesn´t specify the respective system.Many regards,
Elisabeth -
Dear all,
I owe to provide that part of my explanation relating to the connection between neuronal processes and consciousness.
As yet I only have mentioned opponent cells as feature-specific neurons. But we have a lot of this type of cells, e.g. double opponent cells, which are responsive to the contrast between center and periphery. These cells fire when e.g. „red on a background of green“, blue on a background of yellow etc.
Neurons in direction to parietal (MT –mediotemporal /MST –medial superior temporal) regions (dorsale pathway) are responsive to frequencies of depth (above, far, near) . And neurons at the ventral pathway are responsive e.g to lines in a particular orientation and to the motion of lines or angles. Other cells (in IT – inferor temporal regions) in common are responsive to the shape of an object whereas each of these cells is responsive to another orientation.(see Tanaka, 1993: Neuronal mechanisms of object recocognition. Science, 262, 684- 688)It is necessary to conceive that feature-specific cells beside their well known functions inhere the ability to close units of function relating to the variables of the rule – a unit „condition“, a unit „effects/affects“ ( I call it „evenance“ – Latin: evenire), a rule „consequence“.
A red-green opponent cell and a „red on a background of green“- double opponent cell which at the first step belong to the unit „condition“ while a white-black cell belongs to the unit „evenance“ and a blue-yellow cell belongs to the unit „consequence“ at the second step together belong to the unit „condition“ to create (not represent) what we experience as the color of an object. And neurons in MT and MST belong to the unit „evenance“ to create what we perceive as the location and motion of this object while neurons in IT belong to the unit „consequence“ to create what we experience as the shape of this object.
If these cells do so then color, shape and location of an object are bound together and the successful binding is indicated by phasing their activities.
All processes must run parallel and recursive and this effects the high dynamic in the brain.As these two things have happened – the connection of feature-specific cells and supposably supported by GTS (see Alfredo´s answer in the „Hydrocephalus“- forum) which happend in the first system of neuronal connections and activities, and these cells (the GTS respectively) are able to work /to create (and these processes happen in the second system) – there is consciousness in consequence:
An individual is able to perceive this object. And in the following period the individual draws a distinction between his-/ herself and the object, when reach out into the world outside to touch, catch, grasp that object.My idea is that these three systems – the system of GTS, the system of neuronal events to create what we experience and consciousness are inseperably associated to each other. But neither the first nor the second system is able to interact with
Maturana and Varela suggested biological systems as remaining structurally open yet functionally closed (my preference is operationally closed) and therefore a „system can re-enter itself endlessly i.e., create repetitive loops in which end products are fed back into the system as new starting points.“ (see the article „Varela and the Uroboros –The psychological significance of reentry“, in Hans´ Parlaris-forum http://brain.parlaris.com/ftopic41.html )
To be structurally open a system needs an operation (Maturana named this operation „observer“).
My proposal is that consciousness is an autonomous, structurally open yet operationally closed – and therefore needs an operation to generate the structurally openness. I suggest that this operation must be the „I“. In this function the I must be able to take the creations produced in the second system immediately.
Unfortunately (or fortunately for our survival) neurons in our brains have to create our Self, too. For the ability and the necessity to distinguish between the own self and the objects the I as an operation and the self as a creation must merge with each other.
In the second period I mentioned above the individual by interacting and dealing with an object learns about further features and properties: it is hard or soft, row or sleek, cold or hot, etc. At the end of the second period an object can be identified by its invariant features.
Due to the rule a third period is needed – and this is the re-entry into the distinction: the reflection of the own behavior to learn about the purpose and function: a pencil to write, a cup to drink…
With the reentry in the third period human individuals are enabled to develop a new property: the language, i.e. language evolves from processes in the third period by self-reference.And in every period and at each re –enter consciousness exhibits new and more dimensions.
Elisabeth
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Dear Elisabeth,
just a quick one: my parlaris forum is not public, so you cannot link to content that is posted there.
The article you have mentioned can be found here
Yours friendly
Hans
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