Paul Churchland´s description of „Qualia“
Elisabeth Daegling
Saturday, 27 September 2008 21:52 UTC
In „Conversations on Consciousness“ by Susan Blackmore Paul Churchland delivers the following statement:
„The deceptive idea was of this special epistomological window, vision, that alone gave you access to light (…). You may talk about electromagnetic fields oszillating, some will say, but that´s changing the subject, you´re not talking about light(..)
It turned out that presumptively `visjective´ light was indeed electromagnetic waves(…). ..it looks like the `subjective´ visual sensation of redness is going to be a particular pattern of activations across your opponent process cells in the LNG or V4.“
This description corresponds approximately to my assumption, which I had posted in BPCC.
Churchland continues: „Electromagnetic waves don´t cause the light; they´re not correlated with light; they are light.“
My proposal is that electrophysical patterns will be created by the interaction of cells like e.g opponent cells; and that these patterns are what we call „qualia“.
Many regards,
Elisabeth
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Replies
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Dear Elisabeth,
Sorry for repling to you only now, but I was very busy last week. I can agree that your ‘proposal is that electrophysical patterns will be created by the interaction of cells like e.g opponent cells; and that these patterns are what we call „qualia“ ’. But it is only the objective point of view or a description of qualia in the brain. Actually, it is very similiar to Edelman´s theory (2004, Wider than sky – the phenomenal gift of consciousness). Qualia are ’subjective’ and it seems to be important to understand what it is like to have them for different organisms. So they don´t mean just a type of brain property, because some organisms don´t have brain. qualia seems to correspond to different animal perceptions of the world. -
Dear Elisabeth,
Please, I forgot to say something important to you in my last reply, I mean:
Your friendly,
Arthur -
Dear Arthur,
now I have to apologize for my late answer, I´m sorry.
You wrote: But it is only the objective point of view or a description of qualia in the brain.
I agree and would like to add that this must be the first step: to accept that these patterns are what we call qualia in our subjective perspective. The next one must be a plausible explanation for fact that we experience qualia like colors or pain.
This aspect I didn´t reflect until now, that some organisms don´t have a brain but have to perceive their environments.
But can we be confident or sure that organisms like e.g. earthworms, spiders or even protozoa really experience qualia?
Julian Jaynes holds that e.g. the reaction of an earthworm after cutting him into two parts will only be a phenomenon of mechanical discharge.Could it be conceivable that qualia exclusively are properties of organisms who have a brain?
Many regards
Elisabeth -
Dear Elisabeth,
First of all, thank you for your comment and interest on this topic. Traditionally, qualia have been conceived as “exclusively properties of organisms who have a brain” and this is the common view in the recent discussions among different theories of consciousness. However, I believe that we can conceive qualia as the way an organism have some experiences in its enviorement, I mean, the way it perceives the things and acts in relation to them. So qualia is not only the properties of experiences of colors or pain. In this sense, we can understand qualia among different experiences
of an organism in the enviorement and this implies that we conceive ‘experience’ largely and beyond the human experience in the world. I’d like to mention two points here: 1) even though qualia are properties of some types of experiences, they are the way the things seems to be in the point of view of an organism – here the key-word is ‘point of view’. 2) if we take qualia as the point of view in the experience, then we can hold a biological principle of continuity among different organisms – this is an approach on cognitive ethology held by Donald Griffin and I think it is very plausible explanation for advancing the study of qualia. Briefly, I think we need to conceive experiences from what we are not the subject.
Cordially,
Arthur -
Dear Arthur,
you wrote: “if we take qualia as the point of view in the experience, then we can hold a biological principle of continuity among different organisms,”
and I agree to your statement and to Marc Hausers opinion that we share our planet with thinking animals.
But I would like to argue that this kind of experiences needs at least sensory systems to enable organisms to perceive their environment. And this means that these organisms must be able to distinguish (in an unconscious way) between their environment and themselves.If we set this definition then primitive or proprioceptive reflexes on stimuli shown by organisms without a brain, e.g. by invertebrates, can´t be nominated as „qualia“. Or in my opinion we do have to amplify and specify the term „qualia“,
What do you think?Cordially,
Elisabeth -
My dear Elizabeth,
I don´t think it is necessary for organisms “to be able to distinguish (in an unconscious way) between their environment and themselves” for them to have qualia experience, as you stated. In my view, we can understand ‘qualia’ experiences as the way the things look like to different organisms, I mean, the qualitative or phenomenal properties of some types of experiences and what it doesn´t need to imply a distinction between the organism and its environment. In this way of reasonning, qualia corresnd to an internal sense of experience or they have non-intentional content. So, I agree with you and “we do have to amplify and specify the term qualia”. Actually, it was I had stated when I claimed for a large conception of ‘experience’.
Your friendly,
Arthur -
Dear Arthur,
I apologize if my answer didn´t reveal what I mean.
As I mentioned above I´m confident that the physical nature of qualia must be particular patterns of the activity of specific neurons e.g. opponent cells. But this assumption applies to organisms who have a brain.
Assumed I´m right then the activation across these specialized neurons could be one of the causes why we are able to distinguish between environment and ourselves. And this property enables us to act and to react on stimuli.Hence I ask for the physical nature of qualia of organisms without a brain and the kind of particular or rather unspecific patterns of activity. But whatever it will be, it must enable these organisms to correct reactions or reflexes on stimuli.
Many regards
Elisabeth -
Dear Elisabeth,
I agree completely with you that “the physical nature of qualia must be particular patterns of the activity of specific neurons e.g. opponent cells. But this assumption applies to organisms who have a brain. Assumed I´m right then the activation across these specialized neurons could be one of the causes why we are able to distinguish between environment and ourselves. And this property enables us to act and to react on stimuli”. It is a perfect description !
Now about your question, “for the physical nature of qualia of organisms without a brain and the kind of particular or rather unspecific patterns of activity. But whatever it will be, it must enable these organisms to correct reactions or reflexes on stimuli”.
What I have in mind when I claim for a larger conception of qualia is the concept of ‘Umwelt’ by the zoologist Jakob on Uexkull in the last century. We can translate ‘Umwelt’ for ‘self´world’ and it means the way a specific organism perceives and acts on its environment. Although, von Uexkull is a reference from the last century, he still has a very great influence in the recent cognitive ethology (see Donald R. Griffin, Animal Minds, 1992). So, we can apply the concept of Umwelt or self-world for describing the ways different organisms have to perceive and to act on their environment or what von Uexkull calls the ‘subject’ or ‘subjectivity’ of a specific experience. Of course, the concept of Umwelt or self-world implies the knowledge of the internal states and physiology of the different organisms, for example, from lower scales (jelly-fish) to higher scales (human being) and how they are able to have “correct reactions or reflexes on stimuli”.
So I think the concept of Umwelt or self-world can make us understand ‘qualia’ the subject or subjectivity of an organism´s experience. Please, I remind you the text of introduction for this forum in which I present the general ideas of Umwelt and qualia.
Yours friendly,
Arthur -
Dear Colin Hales,
Thank you for joining qualia group and I expect your contribuition.
Best to you,
Arthur -
To everybody !
I suppose all you are in vacation. So we have this soundy silence ! I´m expecting your comments and contruibuition to this group.
Your friendly,
Arthur
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