Was Nagel looking for an explanation of 'qualia' or just for metaphors?
Alfredo Pereira Jr
Monday, 01 September 2008 13:17 UTC
The Thomas Nagel 1974 paper, an obligatory reference for the discussion of ‘qualia’, has several virtues. One of them has not been praised in the philosophical literature: Nagel seems to imply that the description of ‘qualia’ can only be made by means of metaphors. Therefore, he does not seem to be interested in a scientific explanation of ‘qualia’. The same kind of situation is found in Chalmers 1996 “The Conscious Mind” book, where ha writes that phenomenal experience supervenes naturally but not logically from physical reality. If it is not logically, an explanation cannot be in terms of deductive arguments, although Chalmers himself mentions the possibility of an explanation based on bridge principles and using (the other, Ernst) Nagel’s framework of deductive scientific explanations.
Is now the time to recognize that ‘qualia’ can be described only metaphorically?
Alfredo Pereira Jr.
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Replies
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Dear Alfredo,
That´s right: Nagel does not seem to be interested in a scientific explanation of ‘qualia’. But I don´t aggree that he thinks qualia in terms of a description of them only by means of metaphors. Even though he has same similiar approaches to Chalmers as you wrote (“that phenomenal experience supervenes naturally but not logically from physical reality”), Nagel seems to be interested in holding that phenomenal experiences are something real/natural in the world. Recently, Nagel has tried to develop an extensive conception of ‘experience’ including non-human experiences. So I think it is not “the time to recognize that ‘qualia’ can be described only metaphorically”. We need to understand ‘experience’ from which we are not the subject.
Best,
Arthur -
Dear Alfredo,
That´s right: Nagel does not seem to be interested in a scientific explanation of ‘qualia’. But I don´t aggree that he thinks qualia in terms of a description of them only by means of metaphors. Even though he has same similiar approaches to Chalmers as you wrote (“that phenomenal experience supervenes naturally but not logically from physical reality”), Nagel seems to be interested in holding that phenomenal experiences are something real/natural in the world. Recently, Nagel has tried to develop an extensive conception of ‘experience’ including non-human experiences. So I think it is not “the time to recognize that ‘qualia’ can be described only metaphorically”. We need to understand ‘experience’ from which we are not the subject.
Best,
Arthur
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