My suggestion is that neuronal processes run rule-describing. I have proposed that it must be a general cause-effect- rule and I refered to a contribution of Wolf Singer – that the general organization of the structure of the brain suggests to the conclusion that in the neocortex a single algorithm of processing must be realized which suits to the application of the most different contents and which iteration could lead to increasing cognitive (mental) efforts. I suggest that such a general rule could be this algorithm.

Thus the rule itself must be a description of causal correlations: condition–action/effect–consequence-units – or in a more formal kind: If X (condition) and Y (action/effect), then Z (consequence) must be included.
X, Y and Z are blank positions, variables in which different contents could be filled in. And now I ought to make a prediction: neurons additional to their well-known functions gain some new functions accordingly to the particular variable. That means the particular function of a neuron is not arbitrary.

I have demonstrated by an interaction of opponent cells by an example in which way the rule must apply :
„A red-green- neuron (condition X) a white-black-neuron( action/ effectY ) and a blue-yellow- neuron (consequence Z including). These neurons receive impulses by cells of th receptor-systems and interact in a way which could be descripted by the rule. If the rule ist „fulfilled“ they synchronize their activities.“
The reason why a red-green-neuron has the function X is: it receives signals by S-, L- and M-receptor-cells and the subtraction of the L- and- M- inputs effects an axonal reaction. This reaction is the precondition for the reaction of the white-black-cell (Y) which on its part adds the L- and M- reactions. The function Y of the white-black-cell (luminance) is due to dependance of the exposure to light. The difference between the reaction of the white-black-cell and the S-receptor-reaction leads in consequence to a blue-yellow-polarity.

In the same way – so my predinction – feature-specific neurons in premotor- and motor areas (to compute the lokalization and the motion of an object ) and temporal regions ( to compute the contours) must interact in the same way.

Rule-descripted interacting must have a second effect – the production (or creation) of electrophysical potentials – or patterns (I think, event-related potentials and slow brain potentials might be good candidates for this job). I suggest that these space-time-patterns are identical with what we experience – and identic means: patterns and experiences own the same properties – they are one and the same in two different views: measureable patterns in the third-person-view and first-person-view when they will be experienced.

Due to my assumption that all processes run iterating at least in the first period colour-specific neurons form the variable condition, motion-specific neurons form the variable Y and contour-specific neurons form the variable Z to run rule-descripted. In common they are involved in a process to produce a complex pattern which is identic with the shape of an object – as a homogeneous whole.
To produce this complex pattern all processes must run recursive.

Elisabeth Dägling

I have called it an affiliate forum to Alfredo’s forum here from the beginning and so far there is only one discussion going on there with people who have been invited: The topic is similar to the definition thread here.

Today I launched a new initiative there: a poll and an open discussion about the idea to create something like a “Consciousness Cafe”, a meeting place in the internet that would serve less serious functions than this forum can provide.
I would be very much interested in feedback about this idea, here and also over there. Go vote!

Yours friendly
Hans

The success of Hans Ricke’s effort to discuss the definition of ‘consciousness’ offers an opportunity to appreciate similar efforts, make comparisons and look for a synthesis.
Chris Nunn (one of the Editors of the Journal of Consciousness Studies, and author of ‘De la Mettrie’s Ghost” and “From Neurons to Notions”) made a very relevant survey 5 years ago, on the (now inactive) Psyche-B discussion list. Below I reproduce a summary of the results (written by Chris) for our discussion
According to Chris, the results seem to show that there is (or at least was) a range of meanings attached to the term ‘consciousness’ , which appear sufficiently different from one another to
imply that people may often be talking past one another when discussing it. What are the main meanings suggested by the results? Can we do anything to improve matters?

Alfredo Pereira Jr.

[Summary by Chris Nunn]

Questionnaire results from 62 respondents to a posting on the Psyche-B list in 2003. The ‘consciousness’ questions (4 – 18) were derived from responses of 20 people on the list to a previous open-ended enquiry as to what they meant by the term ‘consciousness’. Figures in brackets refer to of respondents answering ‘yes’ to each question; the in q. 2 is >100 because a few people had more than one affiliation.

Please note that the 62 respondents were a self-selected sample, from a total of around 600 subscribers to the Psyche-B list at the time.

(1) My age is: < 35 (21) 35 – 55 (47) > 55 (32)

(2) My main professional affiliation is:
Computer studies/AI (15)
Neurology/ neurophysiology (15)
Philosophy (24)
Physics/ mathematics (5)
Psychology (21)
Psychotherapy (6)
Other (26)

(3) My language status is:
Native English speaker (73)
Not native, but am fluent in English (18)
English sometimes gives me problems (8)

(4) Consciousness is the form of mentality with which we are most familiar (45)

(5) Human consciousness comes in a range of grades/intensities (68)

(6) Consciousness is a name for the condition an organism is in when there is something that it is like to be itself (42)

(7) Consciousness is a ‘suitcase’ word for a range of cognitive functions which may not have much in common with one another (35)

(8) Consciousness is an emergent property (52)

(9) Consciousness is a simulation of reality in relation to both the environment and the body (27)

(10) Consciousness is a qualitatively distinct aspect of the universe that human, and perhaps other, brains are able to access and experience (35)

(11) Subjectivity is essential to consciousness (63)

(12) Consciousness is the difference we perceive when we wake from
dreamless sleep (40)

(13) Consciousness is characterized by knowledge that we have it; i.e. introspectability/reportability (42)

(14) Consciousness is, in some meaningful sense, a unity (50)

(15) Consciousness is the sum total of the qualia that we experience (32)

(16) Consciousness is a function of human verbal abilities (5)

(17) Consciousness is something which could, in principle, be generated
by machines (39 )

(18) The nature of consciousness is such that animals may share it to some degree (82)

And now for two final questions:

(19) The list of statements (4 – 18) misses one or more essential characteristics of consciousness (47)
If ‘yes’, please describe what is missing.

(20) None of the statements (4 – 18) captures the essence of consciousness (32)
If ‘yes’ please state what concept(s) are missing.

The final two questions show that around half the respondents (13 people answered ‘yes’ to both questions) thought the statements incomplete or very incomplete, but their responses were a mixed bag. Some identified concepts that were missing from the list (intentionality; some notion of dynamic interaction with physical, social and cultural environments; emotional, ethical and spiritual dimensions). Others made cryptic statements or expressed puzzlement. A few stated their personal theories. A final subgroup re-worded one or more of the statements provided (when it was very obvious that this was what they had done they were given a ‘yes’ in relation to the appropriate statement, even if they had not already provided it themselves; this was done in 7 cases, most often in relation to question 7).

[PS.: I remember I put an X in “English sometimes gives me problems” – Alfredo]

Source: ScienceDaily

New Research On Octopuses Sheds Light On Memory

ScienceDaily (Jun. 17, 2008) — Research on octopuses has shed new light on how our brains store and recall memory, says Dr. Benny Hochner of the Department of Neurobiology at the Alexander Silberman Institute of Life Sciences at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
Why octopuses?
Octopuses and other related creatures, known as cephalopods, are considered to be the most intelligent invertebrates because they have relatively large brains and they can be trained for various learning and memory tasks, says Dr. Hochner.
Their behavior repertoire and learning and memory abilities are even comparable in their complexity to those of advanced vertebrates. However, they are still invertebrate mollusks with brains that contain a much fewer number of nerve cells and much simpler anatomical organization than that of vertebrate brains. This unique constellation was utilized to tackle one of the most interesting questions in modern neuroscience, which is how the brain stores and recalls memories
In a previous study, Hochner discovered that an area in the octopus brain that was known to be important for learning and memory showed a robust, activity-dependent, long-term synaptic potentiation (LTP)—a process which is strikingly similar to that discovered in vertebrate brains.
This LTP process accelerates the transformation of information between nerve cells by enhancing the transmission of electrical signals through a special structure called the synapse for days and even a lifetime. It is believed that in the area in the brain that stores memories, the synaptic connections between nerve cells that are more active during a specific learning function are strengthened by this activity-induced LTP. One can describe this process as an “engraving of memory traces” in the neuronal networks that store information for a long time, says Hochner.
In a recent article in the journal, Current Biology, Hochner described how he tested these hypotheses and ideas in the brain of the octopus. He blocked the ability of the brain to use LTP during learning by utilizing artificial LTP and though electrical stimulation.
When LTP was blocked with this technique shortly before training for a specific task, the experimental group of octopuses did not remember well the task when tested for long-term memory the day after training. Similar results were obtained when sensory information was prevented from getting into the learning and memory area by lesioning a specific connection in the brain. These findings therefore support the finding that LTP is indeed important for creating memories.
The fact that this was revealed in an invertebrate suggests that this process (LTP) is an efficient mechanism for mediation of learning and memory. The research results in the octopuses also shed new light on how memory systems are organized. Even if one accepts that LTP is important for learning and memory, however, Hochner stresses that further research will be required to understand how this cellular process is utilized in other animal or human brains for storing memories and how these memories are recollected.
The results can also have implications with respect to the organization of learning and memory systems, says Hochner. It is documented that memory processes can be divided into a short-term memory of minutes or a few hours and long-term memory that can store important events and facts for days or even our entire lifetime. Interestingly, notes Hochner, his results show that as in mammals, including humans, the short and long-term memory in the octopus are segregated into two separate systems, each in different locations in the brain.
It is not completely understood how these two systems are interconnected, if at all. However, the organization in the octopus demonstrates a sophistication that was not described yet in other animals. In the octopus, the short-term and long-term systems are working in parallel, but not independently. This is so because the long-term memory area—in addition to its capacity to store long-term memories—also regulates the rate at which the short-term memory system acquires short-term memories. This regulatory mechanism is probably useful in cases where faster learning is significant for the octopus’ survival in emergency or risky situations.

My defense is that if you look at an autistic child (since they are autistic they could not have been taught or grasped the idea of innate love), many of them seem to feel no special attachment for those who take care of them, the one who bore them, their mother. For some autistic people it seems that if you were to take them away from their home and mom right now and have a different person raise them, they would feel the same towards the new person as they did the old one after they got use to the new person in a couple of months. Even when their mom had been with them their whole life, years and years, they wouldn’t even care, maybe not even notice, that she was gone.

My peers do point out that I don’t really know that the autistic person would notice as we are no experts on them, and just speculating. Also though, what if the child was switched at the hospital by accident, and years later the mom bumps into her real child and they do not know it is each other, the mother would not have the innate love for her real child and treat him with indifference thinking he is just a stranger. So the mother and child do not have this love that is suppose to transcend all borders and really only love each other since they think that person is there mom/child.

I guess what I’m asking is does innate love exist, and give examples of it existing/not existing.

And he also gave his own definition, which is a remarkable one :

“I suggest the following succinct definition:

Consciousness is a transparent phenomenal experience of the world from a privileged egocentric perspective.”

My actual concern is the situation that no generally agreed upon definition or a set of definitions exists within the fields of science that are working on the phenomenon of consciousness. This missing definition could be a kind of minimal consensus, with very few properties, but even that does not seem to exist.

There are many different views on this matter:

Thomas Metzinger: – an ill-defined term
David Chalmers: – we need more definitions
Christof Koch: – we just need a rough definition
Max Velmans: – we follow the common usage in which the term “consciousness” is synonymous with “awareness” or “conscious awareness”
Andrew Brook: – It is unlikely that consciousness studies will ever achieve a sound scientific footing with such an imprecise and ungainly conceptual toolbox
( these statements – Chalmers and Koch – not to be taken literally, but from how I remember the talks )

My idea that a well founded group of veteran consciousness researchers should be locked up like in a ‘conclave’ until they have come up with some sensible agreement has not been entirely embraced, which may be due to many reasons.

I still think this task is overdue and the current situation is almost embarrassing and it is the obligation of those people who want to establish a science of consciousness.

So getting back to Arnold’s definition I do not think it is possible to find wider agreement upon a definition like that. Also I believe a process of definition will need a longer determined effort, in which properties will be included others will be excluded. As long as there is not even undisputed wether consciousness is a real or an illusiory phenomenon, as long as there is still unlclear wether consciousness is only receptive or as well active, we are facing quite some task, but I think it is worth going for it.

references:
Max Velmans on Defining Consciousness
Andrew Brook on Terminology of Consciousness
John Searle on Consciousness
Thomas Metzinger on The Problem of Consciousness
Robert van Gulick on Consciousness
Rocco Gennaro on Consciousness
David M. Rosenthal on Concepts and Definitions of Consciousness

I have reluctance against the statement that there can be attention without consciousness, which is an extraordinary claim in my opinion. The evidence they give here can be read in more depth in an article by Jiang et al. . This article by Buschman and Miller may by interesting as well for a discussion.
As this is a huge topic with some history one can also browse David Chalmers collection

Christof Koch and Naotsugu Tsuchiya have published their view and obviously there are important statements from Bernard Baars, Stanislas Dehaene and Victor Lamme to name a few.

The claim that there may be attention without consciousness is possibly stretching the understanding of terms too much in a “lab-direction” which ultimately loses connection with a common and sensible understanding of the terms. I doubt that it is meaningful to say someone attends to an objects when in reality there is only an unsuccessful attempt to attend by looking in the direction of that object. We also have to acknowledge natural limitations: visual attention is obviously not naturally to be performed the way binocular rivalry tests suggest. What naturally happens is a kind of competition between different contents of consciousness and attention. This process of competition has voluntary and involuntary aspects. Research should support an understanding that enables people to be aware and attend to the contents that are relevant and important in their lives and the conditions they are in. Obviouslly both attention and awareness can be distracted, which may be not only unwanted but even dangerous.

The article by Marieke L. Schölvinck, Clare Howarth, and
David Attwell in NeuroImage (just published) might be of interest to
everyone. It suggests that “conscious perception reflects
surprisingly small local alterations in mean cortical neuronal firing rate
and energy consumption: perceiving visual stimulus movement, altered
tactile vibration frequency, or tone stream separation, changes local
cortical energy use by less than 6%. energy use is the basis of functional
imaging techniques such as positron emission tomography (PET) and blood
oxygen level dependent functional magnetic resonance imaging (BOLD fMRI).”
I’ve been surprised that the conscious component doesn’t simply leap out of
the evoked potential trace in studies like Stan Dehaene’s lab does so
beautifully. Del Cul, Baillet & Dehaene recently showed that the difference
starts off quite small, and then becomes noticeably larger. Antti Revonsuo
and his students show similar results. I don’t know what the energetics of
that might be.
Notice, by the way, that Schölvinck et al are NOT doing conscious-
unconscious comparisons, but perceptual discriminations. From our point of
view, of course, that suggests they are not looking at “conscious perception
AS SUCH,” but rather “differences between conscious percepts.” They are not
doing contrastive analysis, to use the best term I’ve been able to think of.
I’d love to know what you think of this interesting finding.

With warm wishes,

Bernard Baars

References:

Buzsaki G (2007) The Structure of Consciousness. Nature 446 (7133):
267.
Fellin T, Pascual O, Gobbo S, Pozzan T, Haydon PG and Carmignoto G.
(2004) Neuronal Synchrony Mediated by Astrocytic Glutamate Through
Activation of Extrasynaptic NMDA Receptors. Neuron 43(5): 729-43. Halassa MM, Fellin T, Takano H, Dong JH, Haydon PG. (2007) Synaptic
islands defined by the territory of a single astrocyte. J Neurosci.
27(24): 6473-7.
Quiroga RQ, Mukamel R, Isham EA, Malach R, Fried I. (2008) Human
single-neuron responses at the threshold of conscious
recognition. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 105(9):3599-604.
Melloni L, Molina C, Pena M, Torres D, Singer W, Rodriguez E. (2007)
Synchronization of neural activity across cortical areas correlates
with conscious perception. J Neurosci. 27(11):2858-65.
Palva S, Palva JM. (2007) New vistas for alpha-frequency band
oscillations. Trends Neurosci. 30(4): 150-8.
Pereira Jr A, Furlan FA (2007) Meta-Potentiation: Neuro-Astroglial
Interactions Supporting Perceptual Consciousness. Available from
Nature Precedings
Samonds, JM and Bonds, AB (2005) Gamma oscillation maintains stimulus
structure-dependent synchronization in cat visual cortex. J.
Neurophysiol. 93 (1): 223-36.
Trehub A (1991) The Cognitive Brain. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

You know how you tend to switch off when you have done something repetitively? For example, when you have driven to work a thousand times and now you often arrive at work not remembering your journey. Or you don’t consciously select individual letters on a keyboard when you type, because your subconscious takes over after you are learnt it. Or when you have learnt a language, you don’t have to rack your brain to search for a particularly verb.

Question 1: Do all the examples I have just given call on similar neural pathways?

Question 2 (the BIG one): I remember someone saying on the radio “The thing that most shocks me is that I am not shockable anymore!” She was talking about how she couldn’t get shocked any more, looking at the news. It was this fact that shocked her the most!

In this day and age, we can see stories of tragedy unfold in the four corners of the globe simultaneously.

The question is: what impact does this torrent of negativity have on the neural pathways mentioned above and do you think this is what was desensitizing the woman? The bigger question is, are the media inadvertently contributing to a world where we are becoming increasingly polarized in our feelings?

On the one side: Mirror neurons and pathways related to empathy and pain are triggered when we see a child who has lost both her parents in civil war. But on the other side, it doesn’t shock us so much any more and we are less likely, as a society to take action. Our threshold at which we attend to a given problem has increased.

What are the moral implications of this and do scientist (specifically neuroscientists) have a role to play in the solution? (assuming there is any truth, which it by no means is).

Maybe this issue has been addressed in which case, I would be very grateful for some references. Am I right to think that is a massive problem for society and us as a species?

Does anyone have any ‘pet theories’ that they think would be useful for me to look into? Books or papers that they feel might just offer that snippet of information that could help me fit everything together? Anything at all that they have a gut feeling about which might turn out to be important, even if it sounds a bit loopy? I’m looking into all disciplines – physics, philosophy, neuroscience, psychology – in a (probably forlorn) hope of finding a way to a complete model.

Any suggestions for further study very gratefully received.

MIT researcher Mark Bear and collaborators have done research and written interesting papers on metaplasticity (see recent Abstract below). Perceptual consciousness seems to be involved in this phenomenon – but how?
I would like to know you opinion.
This research also clarifies the possible role of NMDA different subunits in learning/memory/plasticity and possibly in conscious perception.

Best Regards,

Alfredo

Neuron. 2007 Feb 15;53(4):495-502.

Obligatory Role of NR2A for Metaplasticity in Visual Cortex.

Philpot BD, Cho KK, Bear MF.

Light deprivation lowers the threshold for long-term depression (LTD) and
long-term potentiation (LTP) in visual cortex by a process termed metaplasticity,
but the mechanism is unknown. The decreased LTD/P threshold correlates with a
decrease in the ratio of NR2A to NR2B subunits of cortical NMDA receptors
(NMDARs) and a slowing of NMDAR-mediated excitatory postsynaptic currents
(EPSCs). However, whether and how changes in NR2 subunit expression contribute to
LTD and LTP have been controversial. In the present study, we used an NR2A
knockout (KO) mouse to examine the role of this subunit in the
experience-dependent modulation of NMDAR properties, LTD, and LTP. We found that
deletion of NR2A abrogates the effects of visual experience on NMDAR EPSCs and
prevents metaplasticity of LTP and LTD. These data support the hypothesis that
experience-dependent changes in NR2A/B are functionally significant and yield a
mechanism for an adjustable synaptic modification threshold in visual cortex.

PMID: 17296552 [PubMed – in process]

I have been puzzled about the role of inhibition in the brain. For instance, the inhibition of pain is part of the mechanisms that produces pleasure. However, pleasure is more than the absence of pain. Do inhibitory mechanisms also generate the very sensation of pleasure? Or is it dependent on excitatory mechanisms?
Below I reproduce a part of my post to the NN Forum that discusses the Ethics of Cognition-Enhancing Drugs. I wellcome comments that help me to reduce my ignorance on this subject!

“Reducing inhibitory activity (e.g. inhibiting GABAergic inhibitory transmission) is not the same as increasing excitatory activity (e.g. increasing glutamatergic transmission), but in practice the effects may look the same. Normal brain functionning depends on a balance of excitation and inhibition, but the effects of inhibition are still not well understood. Is inhibition just conterbalancing excitation, or does it also have a constructive role? How does inhibition impact on the EEG and BOLD fMRI? These techniques do not identify the contribution of excitatory and inhibitory activity to the generation of (respectively) electric fields (EEG) or hemodynamic responses (fMRI). Until there is a better understanding of inhibition, and the roles of the balance of excitation and inhibition, it is difficult to predict the long-lasting effect of drugs that interfere with these processes”.

Best Regards,

Alfredo

It’s about whether healthy and sick individuals should take drugs to enhance cognition, memory, etc. The discussion stems from a commentary published in this week’s Nature by two Cambridge University researchers.

Have a look and post your comments there.

Dr. Pereira:

P. 20 of BIBACF states “The second possibility is that the membrane channel transfers to the entering Ca2+ a vibratory pattern”

Are you referring to patterns of delivery of populations of Ca2+ ions? Or possibly quantum entanglement? Or do you postulate that there is more than one stable conformation of Ca2+, and that different Ca2+ conformations carry an information signal?

There are an extremely diverse set of theories and beliefs about Chalmers’ infamous “Hard Problem” of consciousness. Most experts have a favored theory about this and could be considered to be in a particular “camp” on this issue. Today, is there anywhere one can go to find concise statements describing each of these “camps”, including comprehensive survey information about who and how many are in each “camp”?

We believe such quantifiable information is critical to further progress and development of thought in such fields and know of no easy way to come up with such information in unbiased ways.

Towards this end, we have created a topic on this issue in the prototype of a new tool that is being called the Canonizer (http://canonizer.com). It is a kind of wiki system with enough structure to manage and quantify point of view (POV) information. There is now a topic on this “hard problem” that is being developed by various experts in the Canonizer here:

http://test.canonizer.com/topic.asp/23

If you scroll down a bit on this page, you’ll find a “Canonizer Sorted Position (POV) Statement Tree” section. This is a kind of table of contents of all the “statements” that are meant to be concise descriptions of each “camp’s” theory. It includes a soon to be “Canonizable” any way you want number of people in each camp.

If your theory is already there, we would appreciate it if you could “join” that camp showing everyone which “camp” you are in. If your favorite theory about how science will or will not be able to resolve this problem is not there, or not properly represented, it would be wonderful if you could help us develop concise statements describing all such.

Thank You

Brent Allsop

When I first came upon this matter through Jonathan Edwards, I felt that is a good starting point for cognition science, because here we face one of the basic phenomena of consciousness. We all experience consciousness as if bound.

This led especially in Germany as far as I know to the view that y-synchrony is a strong candidate for a correlate to consciousness because it shows different consciousness-related parts of the brain working at the same time – synchronized.

I took the view for real first, but lately developed some doubt that indeed the phenomenon may be just apparent. That would lead to the idea that the different parts of conscious content only appear to be bound, when in real reality the happen at almost the same time. The would not be bound spacially nor if we look more closely even timingwise.
So audition could become conscious elsewhere than vision or thought.

So consciousness could very well not be bound. One of the lines of thought why I doubt doubt consciousness can at all be bound is timing issues.

There are obviously ideas that incoming signals are transformed via chemical intracellular processes. This is probably right, but chemical processes require time. Time that adds up from cell to cell that is involved in the whole process that e.g. starts in a retina cell that is hit by a ray of light. I do not know how well these timing issues are already cleared up by neuroscience, but my hypothesis is that, given that many cells are involved having chemical processes going on, time is to short between an incoming signal and when we become conscious of what we see.

This leads to the idea that there must be at least two ways how the body deals with incoming signals: 1. slow, involving chemical processes, many cells, deconstructing of incoming information, analyzing information, reconstructing information.
2. fast, not involving chemical processes, less cells, leaving incoming information as is.

The first way is a model for learning how to perceive, the second way is a model for primary perception and also immediate perception.

What I would be most grateful about would be information about what has been already found regarding the timing of sensory processes.