Replies

Results

• Derek Smith

  23 August 2007 | 11:23

  I think the time is ripe to (a) design, and (b) simulate in software, a detailed model of cognition.

  This won’t be easy of course, because you will have to solve all the Fodorian problems of modularity at the same time, but the sooner you start, the sooner you will finish.

• Brian Flanagan

  23 August 2007 | 14:08

  Greetings!

  It seems to me that both approaches have merit.

  Many thanks to Alfredo Pereira for taking the initiative in creating this new forum.

  I look forward to many lively and informative exchanges.

  Best,

  Brian Flanagan

• Glen Sizemore

  23 August 2007 | 14:53

  You raise enormously important issues here. I would suggest that what is often at issue – or, rather, should be at issue, are the assumptions that underlie mainstream psychology. It is these concepts that have been transferred to neurobiology. The need for conceptual analyses is not generally recognized. Indeed, it has been argued that, unlike physics, chemistry, and biology, conceptual analysis is absent from psychology and is actively resisted – see, for example:

  http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3814/is_200004/ai_n8878457

  Indeed, Machado, Lourenco, and Silva go so far as to argue that psychology is not even to be considered a science (I would agree, but I would exempt behavior analysis from this criticism). Lest neurobiologists smugly exempt themselves from the criticism, I would remind the reader that cognitive “science” has been incorporated “lock, stock, and barrel” into neurobiology. There are hints that the conceptualizations that characterize mainstream psychology are under attack; O’Regan and Noe’s tome in BBS is such an example, as well as Bennett and Hacker’s (2) scathing indictment of neuroscience.

  I would argue, as should be obvious from the above, that it is not only facts and theories that should be discussed, but the underlying conceptualizations as well.

  (1). A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness. [It is telling, I think, that one of the most frequent criticisms of this paper was that it is “behavioristic”).

  (2). Bennett, M.R. and Hacker, P.M.S., Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, 2003, Blackwell Publishing, ISBN 140510838X.

• Alfredo Pereira Jr

  23 August 2007 | 15:45

  Dear Derek, Brian and Glen:

  Thank you very much for your participation.

  Derek, do you think that softwares used to simulate mental phenomena in past decades missed something important about cognition and consciousness? For instance, in 1949 Donald Hebb (“The Organization of Behavior”) related learning with a “metabolic change”, but neural networkers have modeled mostly changes in patterns of connectivity (usually conceived as boolean).

  Glen, what do you think about the distinction of ‘vehicle’ and ‘content’ of consciousness made by O’Regan and Noe?
  Would you agree with a combination of vehicle internalism (the mechanisms of consciousness being internal to the brain) with content externalism (the contents of consciousness being determined by events external to the brain, as cultural patterns)??

  Regarding Bennett and Hacker, their criticisms of neuroscience provide some constructive suggestion? Ot is it just a matter of stop looking inside the skull and studying behavior to know more and better about the mind?

  Best Regards,

  Alfredo

• Glen Sizemore

  23 August 2007 | 16:46

  Hi Alfredo,
  Though I read O’Regan and Noe’s paper in its entirety, I do not recall the discussion of these terms, but I can comment on your interpretation. First let me say this: consciousness is a behavioral distinction. As such, there is some worthwhile meaning that can be given to the notion that “the mechanisms of consciousness [are] internal to the brain,” but the statement is in need of clarification. I would say that physiology mediates behavioral function, and the brain is certainly physiological. My view (consistent, I think, with radical behaviorism as I understand it) is that “consciousness” (in the sense of “self-aware”) is not a distinct mechanism, either in the sense of “behavioral mechanism” or in the sense of “physiological mechanism.” It is exposure to particular environments that “make us self-aware” in the same sense that it is exposure to particular environments that “make us aware of” other features of the world. The mechanisms that “make us aware of” features of the world are the same ones that “make us aware of” features of our own behavior, including features that are only observable by the behaving individual. It is a matter of stimulus control. The “contents of consciousness” are our own behavior, and our behavior is, to a large extent, a product of reinforcement contingencies (given, of course, a body that is the product of natural selection). I do not like O’Regan and Noe’s notion of “knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies.” The term “knowledge” is an explanatory fiction – we do not behave in particular ways because we know certain things. We behave in particular ways because of exposure to contingencies. O’Regan and Noe cite their use of “knowledge” as the thing that separates them from behaviorists, but the term suffers from the same sort of problems that “representation” does. O’Regan and Noe ARE, essentially, behaviorists, whether they recognize it or not. They reject the appellation “behaviorist” because of the negative connotations that this term has acquired because of the misrepresentations of it by behaviorism’s detractors.

  I must admit that I have not read Bennett and Hacker, but I have read excerpts and reviews. I am not terribly motivated to read their book as I have been familiar with the problems of the “mereological fallacy” for decades, and their book largely focuses on this. Skinner repeatedly made the point that the brain does not see, decide, think, want, etc. etc. etc. etc., and to say that it does is a category error. I do not think that Bennett and Hacker say that we should “stop looking inside the skull”; one of them (I can’t remember if it is B or H) is an accomplished neuroscientist (the other is a Wittgensteinian philosopher). Bennett an Hacker are not behaviorists (though Wittgenstein is often viewed as a “philosophical behaviorist”) but their view is, as I said, consistent with radical behaviorism. I do not know, in answer to your question, whether or not they offer anything positive in addition to their plea to avoid the “mereological fallacy.” I will offer my own: The sorts of behavioral processes investigated by behavior analysts (and used to account for complex human behavior in speculative fashion) must return to the fore. Neuroscience must eventually say how the nervous system mediates these behavior functions. I will leave it at that for now as my reply has become lengthy.

  Cordially,
  Glen

  P.S. The “merelogical fallacy” is the fallacy of referring to parts of a whole in the same terms that one uses to refer to the whole. PEOPLE think, decide, see etc. To say that the brain does these things says nothing. If the terms are in need of analysis at the level of the whole animal, they remain in need of analysis at the level of the nervous system. The solution is not to continue the infinite regress but, rather, to explain seeing, hearing, deciding etc. in terms relevant to the level of analysis appropriate to the nervous system.

• Alfredo Pereira Jr

  23 August 2007 | 19:26

  Dear Glen:

  The distinction was actually made by O’Brian and Opie. I confused the names. You were kind to discuss the issue with my wrong reference attached to it!

  From B & H I read a paper in the “Progress in Neurobiology” journal, where they make a good criticism of Damásio’s “somatic marker”. A colleague (who is a philosopher) was entusiastic about their book.

  Their criticism of the mereological fallacy is surely important for the field of Philosophy of Neuroscience, but I suspect brain scientists will not care for commiting the fallacy as long as they are progressing empirically in the discovery of brain substrates of cognition and consciousness.

  I would not equate conscious content with our own behavior. B & H’s argument against Damásio could be used here. They say (in summary) that it is not because our body reacts to noxious stimulation that we feel pain, but the other way, it is because we feel pain that the body reacts.

  Maybe we have a divergence here: I tend to think that behavior is the effect, not the cause of or identical to our mental states.

  Best,

  Alfredo

• Glen Sizemore

  23 August 2007 | 21:15

  Hi again, Alfredo,

  I find it odd that you would say that “I suspect brain scientists will not care for commiting the [mereological] fallacy”; the mereological fallacy is thoroughly rampant in neuroscience. As long as behavior is not mentioned or alluded to, the mereological fallacy will not usually be present. But any time an author wishes to draw a connection between their research and behavior (which is quite often), you can bet the fallacy will rear its ugly head. On way to look at the mereological fallacy is that it is present anytime the brain is said to do anything that is frequently said of a whole person. The frontal lobes make decisions? No, sorry. The frontal lobes evaluate information? No, sorry. And so forth. Representationalism is inherently fallacious. I would also draw your attention to Machado, Lourenco, and Silva; one might argue that one is making “empirical progress,” but the conceptual bankruptcy of cognitive “science,” and the fields it has corrupted, is inseparable from any evaluation of “progress.” One has found how and where number is represented? Sorry, conceptual nonsense. It is true that Bennett and Hacker’s analysis is relevant to the “philosophy of neuroscience,” but their position is that the “philosophy of neuroscience”is relevant to neuroscience. I agree.

  I should clarify what I mean by “conscious contents” being behavior. If we were to walk into a room and an elephant was there, we would be likely to say “elephant” or, at least, that would be part of an extended locution. Similarly, when we say “I am in pain” or “I am hungry” or “I see a rainbow,” we are responding to our own behavior. As far as “…it is not because our body reacts to noxious stimulation that we feel pain, but the other way, it is because we feel pain that the body reacts” I would disagree. I would say that we say “He feels pain” because someone reacts to stimulation in a particular way, but I would say that it is incorrect to say that it is because we feel pain that we react. One meaning of “feeling pain” is “responding in a particular way to stimulation.” I would say, further, that the “subjective experience” of “feeling pain” is different than what is measured in, say, tail flick, or escape. Saying “I feel pain” is a response to our own behavior.

  Needless to say, I cannot agree with the notion that behavior is caused by mental events. I think that the notion of “mind” is scientifically useless. At least there is no shortage of things to discuss between us.

  Cordially,
  Glen

• Alfredo Pereira Jr

  24 August 2007 | 00:20

  Dear Glen:

  It is clear that we adopt different (although not contradictory) conceptual frameworks.
  Behavior is surely important for a scientific approach to cognition and consciousness. I assume that behavior expresses subjectivity, since a human subject is a person habitating a living body. However, I distinguish behavior and brain processes that cause the behavior. The mental state (extended present) I conceive as a first-person experience supported by the brain process.
  Well, this conceptual discussion may be boring for our scientific colleagues who joined the list. I will open a new topic, “Conceptual Issues”, for this discussion, OK?

  Thank You and Best Regards,

  Alfredo

• Glen Sizemore

  24 August 2007 | 00:56

  Dear Alfredo,

  I will consider your last post to be the beginning of the new thread, which I eagerly await. My apologies for inducing “boredom” in our “scientific colleagues.” I can not help but add that it is disheartening that conceptual issues might be deemed “boring” by our colleagues. But, then again, it is not unanticipated, as my previous posts suggested.

  Sincerely,
  Glen

• Alfredo Pereira Jr

  24 August 2007 | 16:54

  Dear Glen:

  I opened the new topic, “Conceptual Issues”, but it did not appear in the main page of the group. Please click on “View Forum” to enter.

  Best,

  Alfredo

Results