If you had come to this blog because you typed “game theory blog” in google then this article will not come as a shock but for those of you who would expect to see something about either evolution or cancer or (preferably) both then this is not the usual post.
Still, game theory has been making headlines the last couple of weeks and since this is one of my favourite mathematical tools I could not help coming with a post.
Fist, The Economist had an article in which the especulate on how game theory could be used to save the world. One of the problems enforcing the measures needed to prevent climate change is that although most players (countries in this game) recognise to some extend that doing something about it is in everybody’s interest. But also, like in the tragedy of the commons game, players know that what is really in their interest is to let everybody else take the burden of protecting the environment while they keep carrying on as usual. The Economist cites research from an institute called New Energy Finance, but anyone working on game theory knows that one approach to the dilemma of the tragedy of the commons is to punish the free riders. Another complementary solution is to set targets that are less ambitious but that can be achieved quickly in order to have frequent and accurate feedback on what players are cooperating and which ones are not.
It has been proven that game theory can help you be awarded a nobel prize, it would be nice if it could also be a tool to coerce countries into taking the measures needed to prevent climate change (or maybe other tasks that also benefit mankind but require the collaboration of many countries).
What do you think would be an appropriate punishment for the free-riders to balance off the decrease in “quality of life as we know it” of going green?
Good question! The right answer would probably come from politicians and diplomats, the experts of realpolitik. The punishment should be something that makes non cooperation a bad business and keeps cooperators from freeriding. One problem is that the players in this game are a bit more complex than usual so more than thinking of, say, how to design the payoffs as to make Australia more willing to cooperate, we should try to come with sticks and carrots that will affect the fitness landscape (electoral incentives) of austrialian policy makers.